Team Number: Econ-008

matitute # # 3

multitute # # 3

maxinte # # B

matinu # # 3 K

面动油油带林婆佛

multine # \*\* \*

institute # # # K

matine # # 'S R

Matilute # # # #

multilitte # # 13 PK

大学家

matitute # # 3

matinte # # \*

maximue ## # #

maritute ## # 18

而如此推新林塔梯

mutilite # # 13 PS

matime # # # #

matine # # B PR

1. 10 秋 後 第

matinue # # 3 1%

面动机机称林塔梯

mistime # 3 %

小小小小小

multine # \*\* \*

School: Hwa Chong Institution, Singapore

Supervising Teacher: Adam Hu Zihan School: Cornell University, U.S. matitule # # 13 18 mastitute # # # PS

matinte # # 3 1%

面动油油的新林等席

matinte # # B

to the state of the

maritule ## # 13 PR **Report Title:** Does Import Competition From maritute ## # 18 itult # \*\* \*\* China Impact Political Ideology in the U.S.? Evidence From China's Accession to the World

面的机能称林塔梯

面影曲服物状姿体

matinue # # # #

to the the the

matitule ## # '\$ 1% Trade Organisation militute ## muitute ##

Does Import Competition From China Impact withthe start to the Political Ideology in the U.S.? Evidence From

multille # 75 'S

Antitute # # 13 PR

institute \$7 \$7 5

withthe the the the file

mating # # 3 PR

Astitute ## # 13 18

multille # # 'S

maximue # # B

面如此推新林塔際

面动机机都林塔梯

millill # \*\* \*

mutute # # 3 PE

maximue # # B PR

matine # # ' ' R

matinue # # \* \*

Astitute ## #

htitute the the

stitute # #

itute ##

1. 版状

multille # \*\* '3

maxinte # # 3 PK

而时间他教授学家

面对机机称林塔梯

muitue # \*\* \*

mating the # 3 PS

China's Accession to the World Trade

Organisation\* institute 30

## Fan Xilin

September 8, 2019 柳林·浅邻

### Abstract

This paper examines the impact of import competition from China on the political ideology of the U.S. workers using the U.S. General Social Survey data. We use a differences-in-differences specification to determine the differential changes in political ideology between manufacture and non-manufacture industries before and after China's accession to WTO. We find that the manufacture industries experience a rightward shift of political ideology, manifested in the relative increase in support for the Republican Party, relative increase in degree of conservativeness and relative decrease in support for redistribution. We further find that within manufacture industries, political ideology shifts leftward among the low-income workers and among workers in regions experiencing relative income drop; we observe opposite shift among workers with high income and in regions experiencing relative income rise. The results imply that trade liberalisation with China causes political polarisation among the U.S. workers.

Keywords— China, Import Competition, Political Ideology, WTO

<sup>\*</sup>I am grateful to Adam Hu Zihan of Cornell University for his valuable guidance and adinte the the vice. I would also like to thank ST Yau High School Science Award (ASIA) for giving me the opportunity to showcase my work.

Institute # # 3	maxitute # # 3 . maxitute # # 3 .	istitute # # 3 . Institute # #	Institute the ter	tinstitut
institute # ** C	Introduction	Asitute the to the first ture the the	後 序》 [[[]]] []] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []	e matitul
2 C T T S C C C C C C C C C C C C C	<ul><li>Background</li><li>2.1 China's Growth as U.S. Trade Par</li><li>2.2 Impact of Import Competition on</li><li>Data</li></ul>	tner	7 法 光 · · · 7 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	e Mastilul
institute 称 林 塔 梯	<ul> <li>3.1 Demographic Variables</li> <li>3.2 Independent Variables</li> <li>Identification Strategy</li> <li>4.1 Difference-in-Differences</li> </ul>	Anite the the the the the the the the the t	10 10 10 12 12 12	E Interitut
institute # # B	<ul> <li>4.2 Heterogeneity Studies</li></ul>	Anithelit Mar At 13 192	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	e titestitut
5 Takitute # # #	Main Results5.1Support For the Republican Party5.2Conservativeness5.3Support for Redistribution5.4PCA Left-wing Indicator	Antitalle Antite	16 16 17 17 18	E Institut
Enstitute the the 56	Discussion 6.1 Validity of Assumption 6.1.1 Relative Income Drop in M 6.1.2 Parallel Trends	anufacture Industry	21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21	E Institut
institute # # B	<ul> <li>6.2 Mechanism of Results</li></ul>	Political Ideologies of Low-Incon	ne and 23 Income	e taktitut
matitute # # 13 18		Within the total the multility the the	多序。 21 适序 基 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	E Institut

西林资献

西林诸佛

西林资献

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

西法婆佛

林凌佩



# Million 1 Introduction

institute ## #

masitute ##

stitute the the

stitute the the

itute the the

tute #

In the recent decade, trade has been a contentious subject of political discourse in the US. Following China's accession to WTO in 2001, the growing trade deficit with China has gained political importance in the U.S.. According to Autor et al. (2013), 25% to 50% of the manufacture loss in the U.S. can be attributed to rising competition from China. Industries more exposed to import competition from China also saw significant decrease in workers' income as well as increase in plant exit rate (Autor, 2018).

Mistillite the the

频<sup>读 '孩 %</sup>

柳林海像

The large impact of trade liberalisation with China on the U.S. economy has proven to have influence on the voters' preferences. The working class stuck in the Rust Belt hold a bitter grudge against free trade with countries that specialise in manufacturing. Their sentiment is manifested in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, where Donald Trump was elected for his advocacy of protectionist trade policies. With the support of the white working class, Trump accused China of stealing U.S. jobs and started a Trade War against China.

Import competition from China may affect political ideologies other than attitudes towards trade policies and party affiliation. This paper examines the impact of China's accession to WTO on the political ideology of the U.S. workers. We use the General Social Survey Data to conduct analysis. We examine six indicators of political ideology: self-perceived support for the Republican Party, election vote for candidates of the Republican Party, degree of conservativeness, support for improving standard of living of the poor, support for reducing income inequality as well as support for improving social security. We generate a left-wing indicator of political ideology using principle component analysis (PCA) in order to check the robustness of results of the six ideology indicators.

In the first part of our analysis, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) specification to show that manufacture industries and non-manufacture industries experience differential changes in political ideologies after China's accession to WTO. We choose to divide the population by manufacture and non-manufacture industries because the manufacture industries are much more severely impacted by import competition compared to other industries. In the second part, we show that within manufacture industries,

workers with different income levels as well as workers undergone different levels of income change experience differential changes in political ideology.

mistime ##

mistime # #

stitute the the

tute the the

itute # \*\*

Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that, compared to the non-manufacture industries, the manufacture industries experience higher increase in support for the Republican Party, higher increase in degree of conservativeness as well as higher decrease in support for redistribution policies. Generally, there is a rightward shift of political ideology among the manufacture employees. The results are seemingly contrary to the intuitive belief that industries more impacted by competition from China will show more support for redistribution.

However, through heterogeneity studies of subgroups within manufacture industries, we find a polarisation of political ideologies between high-income and low-income workers: the high-income subgroup experiences a rightward shift of political ideologies while the low-income workers experience a leftward shift. That is to say, the counter-intuitive rightward shift on the political spectrum is mainly contributed by the high-income subgroup. We further find a polarisation of individual income between high-income and low-income workers: high-income workers experience substantial income increase while low income workers experience significant income drop. We confirm the correlation between changes in income and political ideologies by finding that workers from regions experiencing higher income rise also experience rightward shift of political ideology. These collectively show that import competition from China causes polarisation of political ideologies between low-income and high-income workers, which is in turn caused by polarisation of income.

The impact of trade liberalisation with China on the U.S. labour market has been well studied in current literatures. Autor et al. (2013) find that industries more exposed to import from China experience increased unemployment, decreased labour participation as well as lower wages. Pierce & Schott (2016) find that industries that saw sharp tariff cut experience severe employment losses. Bloom et al. (2019) find that import competition from China reallocates employment from manufacture to services and from the heartland to the coast. The impact of Chinese competition on U.S. political ideologies is generally understudied, except for a few papers on the impact of trade on the U.S. elections. Autor (2018) find that regions more exposed to import competition show decrease in support for moderate representatives. Margalit (2011) find that voters are significantly more sensitive to job loss as a result of trade than to other causes. The paper most closely linked to us is by Che et al. (2016), which examines the impact of trade liberalization with China on U.S. Congressional elections. Che et al. (2016) find that U.S. counties more exposed to trade with China show more support for the Democratic Party after U.S. trade liberalisation with China.

mistilute ## #

stitute # # #

tute \$ H &

This paper differs from the paper by Che et al. (2016) as we study not only the general impact of Chinese competition on manufacture industries, but the heterogeneous effects on different subgroups within manufacture industries as well. Our findings seem to contradict the results by Che et al. (2016), but a closer look at our heterogeneity studies would reveal that the results are consistent. In this research, we find that the population more negatively impacted by import competition from China show increasing support for the Democratic Party. The overall relative increase in support for the Republican Party is a result of polarisation within manufacture industries.

Another contribution of this paper is that, beyond party affiliation, we also examine the impact of import competition on other dimensions of political ideology, including degree of conservativeness and support for redistribution. Our findings regarding different dimensions of political ideology cohere nicely with each other, giving a comprehensive and well-justified picture of the impact of trade on political ideology. The coherence of our result is also confirmed by the left-wing indicator we generated using Principle Component Analysis(PCA).

## 2 Background

mstitute ## #

stitute the the

htitute the the

itute ##

inte sin the

## 2.1 China's Growth as U.S. Trade Partner

In the past three decades, China experienced spectacular economic growth. From an insignificant economy with an uncertain future, China has transformed into the world's

largest trading state and the second largest economy. From 1991 to 2013, China's share of global manufacturing exports increased from 2.3% to 18.8% (Autor et al., 2016).

mistitule the the

版·法 代

mistilute #####

tute ## ##

stitute 300 3

titute the the

the the the

Owing to China's economic growth, US imports from China grew significantly in the last two decades. From 1990 to 2007, China's share of US imports increased from just 3 percent to 17 percent. In the same period, the trade deficit of US with China grew from 0.3 percent of GDP to 1.7 percent, introducing increasing import competition to US industries without a reciprocal offset in terms of increase in Chinese demand for US exports (Che et al., 2016).

The inflection point of the growth of US import from China is in 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) after 15 years of negotiations. Membership of WTO grants China Most-Favoured-Nation Status, allowing it to enjoy equal trading with all other competitors. This allows China to gain better access to foreign markets, leading to a drastic increase in Chinese export. From 2002 to 2007, Chinese net exports as percentage of GDP increased from 2.6% to 7.7% (Shafaeddin, 2002). Multi-Fiber Arrangement between China and US, which puts a quota limit on textile imports from China, was phased out as part of the WTO agreements, enabling Chinese producers to compete freely in the US market (Brambilla et al., 2010).

## 2.2 Impact of Import Competition on U.S. Manufacture Industries

In particular, the increase in imports from China has significant impact on the US manufacture industry. China has comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactured goods due to its factor endowment in inexpensive labour (Chen, 2009). While China's share of world manufacturing value added increased from 4.1% to 24.0% between 1991 and 2012, the percentage of of US labour force employed in manufacturing fell by a third between 1991 and 2007 (Autor, 2018). Higher levels of unemployment, lower levels of labour participation rate and greater benefits uptake were also observed in counties more exposed to import competition from China.

As can be seen from Figure 1, market penetration rate for US imports from China rose from 0.6 percent in 1991 to 4.6 percent in 2007, with an inflection point in 2001,

Share of US Working-Age Population Employed in Manufacturing (right scale)

mittille m 75 '3

institute \$7 \$7 5

multille # # 'S

multille m # 3



Note: This graph was extracted from the work of Autor et al. (2013)

within the the 'S coinciding with China's accession to the WTO. Before 2001, the import penetration rate increased by 0.11 percentage point per year on average; after 2001, the import penetration rate increased by 0.42 percentage point per year on average. Meanwhile, maxinte # # 3 PK the percentage of US labour force employed in manufacturing fell sharply from 12.6 Institute the th mte m W percent to 8.4 percent (Figure 1).

#### Data 3

stitute # # ' FR

multille # # 3

matinte # \*\*

Avitute # \*\*\*

titute the tet

tute the the

itute the the

前加加斯林资源

~ ~ ~

musitute # #

In this research, our main source of data is the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is part of the National Data Program for the Social Sciences, initiated by National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. The survey has been regularly distributed and collected since 1972. The survey collects answers and keeps an record of the social characteristics and attitudes of the residents of the United States. The vast majority of GSS data is collected in face-to-face interviews in households. From 1972 to 2018, the GSS covers approximately 65000 observations in total and around 1500 observations each year.

withthe ## # 12 PK

antitute # # 'S PL

stitute \$ # 3 PR

stitute # # \*\* \*\*

いちま

## 3.1 Demographic Variables

mistilute #####

itute the t

tute the star

tute the the

In this research, our key demographic variable is industry. We first exclude all the individuals who indicate their working status as "student". This is because students are likely to have financial support from parents and are only taking on part-time jobs. Hence they are not likely to be severely affected by China's impact on the industry they are employed in. We then divide the population into two groups: individuals in the manufacture industry and individuals not in the manufacture industry. The industry code in the GSS is coded using the U.S. Bureau of the Census occupation (2010) and industry codes (NAICS 2007). To divide individuals into manufacture industry and non-manufacture industries, we group industry code 1070 to 3990 to represent individuals in the manufacture industry.<sup>1</sup>

Astitute 35 X

\*\*\*\*\*\*

Other important demographic variables include marital status, sex, age, race, region of residence, total household income, individual income and highest year of school completed.<sup>2</sup> To see category labels, refer to table 9.

### 3.2 Independent Variables

We use two dependent variables to evaluate the party affiliation of the respondents: self-perceived support for the Republican Party and election vote for candidates of the Republican Party. Our main focus is on the proportion of Democrats and Republicans, but there is a sizeable proportion of respondents who indicate themselves as neither. For self-perceived support for the Republican Party, 17% of the respondents indicated "independent" or "other party". For election vote for candidates of the Republican Party, 5.67% of respondents indicated "other party". We analysed data including and excluding these respondents. To see survey questions and category labels for self-perceived party affiliation and election vote, refer to table 10.

<sup>1</sup>In the following sections, we will use both one-digit industry code and two-digit industry code, depending the degree of specificity required. one-digit industry code group all industries with the same first digit in the standard four-digit industry code; two-digit industry code group all industries with the same first and second digit.

<sup>2</sup>Region of residence is divided into nine categories: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific

Maritule # # 3 PR We use four dependent variables to evaluate the political ideology of the respondents: degree of conservativeness, support for improving standard of living of the poor, support for reducing income inequality as well as support for improving social security. towards redistribution. To see survey questions and category labels for these variables, refer to table 10. little # # 13 1%

militute m # "

TURNITUR WE WE CE

multine # \*\* \*

娇<sup>妆~'浅</sup>爷~

multitute mark "

millitute # # 3

Institute # # 13 18

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

面动机机物带带等除

to the We the

millitte # # 3

Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the demographic variables. Table 2 displays the summary statistics of the six attitude indicators we used as dependent variables.

t	the summary statistics	of the six at	ttitude indic	ators w	<i>r</i> e used as de	pendent va	riables.	9.7
1/2 N			1/2 XIV		1/2 1/2	1/2 X	6	1/2 1/2
*** ¥~ **	Table 1:	Summary S	Statistics of	f Demo	graphic Var	iables		太 次 3
inter Stars	stutte mas	stute your	1	16 Mars	list	10 years	int:	B Mars
TINSULVE	EURICE P	INSUM	(1)		IIII Stores	(2)	TINSUL	
		Ma	nufacture		Non 1	Manufactu	re	
		Mean	$\operatorname{Std}$ . $\operatorname{Dev}$	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev	Obs	
	Age	48.00	17.02	8926	45.61	16.72	43268	
B. W.	Female	0.42	0.49	8926	0.56	0.50	43268	is in the second
The allow	Married	0.59	0.49	8926	0.53	0.50	43268	S WAR
Institute.	Highest Educ Year	12.02	2.95	8926	13.25	3.10	43268	
	Race(Black)	0.12	0.32	8926	0.14	0.35	43268	
	$\operatorname{Race}(\operatorname{Others})$	0.05	0.21	8926	0.05	0.23	43268	
	Individual Income	33731.80	22610.26	5628	29802.54	23067.49	30223	A32
*****	ar & the	. We	'B YR	. X	- 13 VAD		0	W. B. MO
ante ante	Black almen	Bak almin		AR BAR		R RAK BI	Ine.	N MAR .
mstitue	Table 2	Summary	Statistics	of Dep	endent Vari	ables	mstiller	

			(1)			(2)		
		Mε	anufacture	е	Noi	n Manufac	ture	
is the	the the the	Mean	Std.Dev	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev	$\sim \mathrm{Obs}$	1/2 Pho
the way and the second	Perceived Party Repub	0.41	0.49	7504	0.42	0.49	36148	the way is a second sec
stitute	Conservativeness	0.56	0.38	7848	0.53	0.39	38434	0
TUPPE	Improve Social Security	0.77	0.30	5829	0.76	0.31	31498	
	Reduce Income Inequality	0.58	0.44	4693	0.56	0.44	23430	
	Help Poor	0.52	0.37	4428	0.52	0.37	22710	
is where	Election Vote Repub	0.50	0.50	7242	0.47	0.50	38638	· p Pro
海水"	频 林 3	资本"	te 3	N S		·····································		额头"
Tastitute	Tastillie Tastillie		finstitute.		linistit		Institut	

matitute # # # #

to the st. is the

mstitute ## # K

\*\*\*\*\*\*

11

面动机机物状等除

to the the B

multille # # B

to the the B

## muinte # # 4 Identification Strategy

mittille m 75 '3

mistilute the the

multille # # 3

distitute the th

stitute the the

titute ##

itute mark 's

"你孩子多

#### **Difference-in-Differences** 4.1

In this research, we employ a differences-in-differences (DID) specification that asks whether US employees in manufacture industries, which are most severely impacted by Chinese competition, experience differential changes in party affiliation, attitudes and political ideologies after China's accession to WTO in 2001. The regression model is as following:

mittille m 75 '3

Institute \$5 X 'S

maxitute # # '# R

mittille # # 3

而时间的教林客院

(1) 城林 塔 化

stitute ## # 3 PS

 $Y_{it} = \theta PostWTO_t \times Manu_i + \delta_n + \mu_t + X_i\gamma' + \varepsilon_{it}$ 

militute ## # The dependent variable  $Y_{it}$  represents the indicators of political ideologies of individual i in year t.  $PostWTO_t$  is a dummy variable indicating whether year t is post-WTO (after 2001).  $Manu_i$  is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is in manufacture industry. The coefficient  $\theta$  before interaction term  $PostWTO_t \times Manu_i$  is the parameter of interest.  $\theta$  captures the difference in the effects of China's accession to WTO on the two groups of people.  $\delta_n$  and  $\mu_t$  represent industry and year fixed effects respectively; they absorb the controls for  $PostWTO_t$  and  $Manu_i$ . Here, lower-case n refers to the two-digit industry code. Absorbing fixed effects  $\delta_n$  and  $\mu_t$  is more flexible than directly controlling  $PostWTO_t$  and  $Manu_i$  because they do not assume same coefficient for all non-manufacture industries and across all years before 2001 and after 2001.  $X_i$  is a vector of demographic controls, which include age, age square, race, sex, region of residence, family income as well as highest year of education.<sup>3</sup>  $X_i$  is added in order to improve precision and reduce variation in residual. Noting that observations are likely to be correlated within industry and independent between industries, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at two-digit industry level.

> One benefit of our DID model is that the time-invariant differences between the manufacture and non-manufacture population are net out. The aggregate shocks in a particular year (such as terrorist attack) that affect both groups identically are also controlled in this model.

> > 12

stitute \$ # 3 PS <sup>3</sup>Age square is added because the effect of age is often non-linear Astitute # # 'S stitute # # 'S Within the the 's

However, we had to make one major assumption in our identification strategy. We assume that the difference in ideologies between the manufacture and non-manufacture industries remains constant without the event of China joining WTO. We check this assumption in two ways.

matinte ###

mistitute ##

The first method is to check whether the trends of each variable for the two groups are roughly parallel before 2001 in the scatter plot diagrams. If so, we can induce that the trends will remain parallel without external events and thus the assumption stands. The diagrams are shown in section 6.1.2.

The second method is to check whether the differential changes experienced by the two groups are driven by the respondents' demographic characteristics; if not, we can infer that the trends for manufacture and non-manufacture industries are likely to be parallel without the event of China entering WTO. To confirm this, we did analysis both including and excluding demographic control  $X_i$ . In our regression analysis, the results are robust to including and excluding the demographic controls, indicating that the differential changes are not caused by demographic differences of the two groups.<sup>4</sup> Hence the assumption stands. stitute # # 13 PR Withit the the the the

#### **Heterogeneity Studies** 4.2

We also explore whether Chinese competition has heterogeneous impact on the political ideologies of different subgroups within manufacture industries. This analysis helps us identify the causes of the differential changes in ideologies experienced by workers in manufacture industries, as compared to the workers in non-manufacture industries.

#### 4.2.1Income Level

mistille # # 3

Astitute the the

Astitute the the

Astitute # #

htitute the the

itute # #

litute the the

itute the the the

"你来

Trade liberalisation often has heterogeneous impact on workers with different levels of income (Aradhyula et al., 2007). In this section, we explore whether Chinese competition causes differential changes in political ideologies among manufacture employees with different individual year income. The identification strategy is as following:

<sup>4</sup>The results are presented in section 5.1 mutute # # \*\* stitute # \*\*\*

stitute # # 3 PS

stitute \$ # 3 PS

maximue # # 3 PR stitute # # 18  $Y_{it} = \beta_1 PostWTO_t \times RichManu_i + \beta_2 PostWTO_t \times PoorManu_i + \delta_n + \mu_t + X_i\gamma' + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$ 

Astitute # \*\* \*

mittille m X 3

multille # 75 'S

医柳林 塔林

 $RichManu_i$  is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is a manufacture employee with an income higher than the median income of manufacture industries. Conversely,  $PoorManu_i$  represents whether the individual is a manufacture employee with a below-median income. The coefficients  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  before interaction terms  $PostWTO_t \times RichManu_i$  and  $PostWTO_t \times PoorManu_i$  are the parameters of interest.  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  capture the differential effects of China's accession to WTO on the high-income manufacture group and low-income manufacture group compared to the rest of the population. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at industry level. For all other notations, please refer to equation (1).

#### **Income Change** 4.2.2

mstille # # 3

stitute the the

hitute #

stitute the the

titute ## #

前加度新林塔

inte m \*

大学

mistille the the

In this section, we aim to explore whether import competition has heterogeneous impact on individuals experiencing different levels of income change. Here, income change refers to change in real year income. Due to the lack of panel data tracking the income of the same individual each year, we use change in income in each region as a proxy. This means, we analyse the correlation between the level of income change and ideology change of all workers in each region as a whole. This is justified because, according to Bloom et al. (2019), different regions are differently impacted by import competition 加他物族送佛 from China. The division of region we use is the same as the division used by Bloom et al. (2019).<sup>5</sup>

Level of income change in each region is measured with the following regression model:

withit the start the 'S  $D_{it} = \beta_i^R PostWTO_t \times Year_t + \theta_i^R Year_t + X_i^R \gamma' + \varepsilon_{it}^R$ 

The above regression is run for every region R.  $D_{it}$  is the individual income of <sup>5</sup>Region of residence is divided into nine categories: New England, Middle Atlantic, East 训励新教生 North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific

individual i in year t. The coefficient  $\beta_i^R$  before interaction term  $PostWTO_t \times Year_t$  is the parameter of interest.  $\beta_i^R$  captures the difference in income of worker *i* in region *R* before 2001 and after 2001.  $\hat{\beta}_i^R$  represents the approximate value of  $\beta_i^R$ .  $X_i^R$  is a vector of demographic controls, which include age, age square, race, sex, region of residence, 柳水吃粥 as well as highest year of education. For all other notations, please refer to equation

thytitute ## #

(4)

(5) m \* 's %

(1).

mininte ###

tustitute ###

stitute \$50 \$

tute 360 H

inte the the

、海茶

After obtaining the indicator of income drop  $\hat{\beta}_i^R$ , we conducted analysis on the relationship between income change and ideology change. The regression model is as 加他新林谱梯 Fuiture # # 'S following: mistilute # # stitute # #

$$Y_{it} = \lambda_i PostWTO_t \times \hat{\beta}_i^R + \eta_R + \mu_t + X_i \gamma' + \varepsilon_{it}$$

The coefficient  $\lambda_i$  is our parameter of interest, which measures the differential impact of China's accession to WTO on manufacture employees across different regions.  $\eta_R$ represents region fixed effect. For all other notations, please refer to equation (1).

#### **Principle Component Analysis** 4.3

To form a coherent picture of changes in political ideologies, we use Principle Component Analysis(PCA) to generate a left-right indicator of political ideologies. The PCA indicator serves as a robustness check for the results on the six indicators of political ideologies we use in this research. The indicator is generated as following:

 $P_i$  refers to the PCA indicator of individual *i*.  $X_i^k$  represents political ideology *k* of individual *i*.  $a_i^k$  represents the optimal weight of  $X_i^k$ .

 $P_i = X_i^k a_i^k$ 

As the indicator is negatively related to support for the Republican Party, negatively related to conservativeness and positively related to support for redistribution, it indicates left-wing political tendency. Hence we name the indicator PCA Left-Wing Indicator. The specific properties of the PCA indicator can be found in Table 11 in the 加加加加数林塔梯 stitute # # # B itule # # \*\* stitute # # # Withit the start the Appendix.

## myittle # # 35 Main Results

mistilute \$75 \$4

multille # #

Astitute \$10 \$

htitute the the

stitute the the

tute the the

~ ~ ~

In this section, the results of difference-in-differences regression on all six dependent variables and the PCA indicator will be displayed and explained.

mistime ##

Table 3 presents the regression results when we include fixed effects and exclude demographic controls. Table 4 presents the regression results when we include both fixed effects and demographic controls. The results are robust as the differences between the coefficients of interest of the same dependent variable in the two tables are all much smaller than the corresponding values of standard error. Hence, the assumption that demographic difference between the manufacture and non-manufacture groups is not the main cause of differential changes in attitudes is valid.

In Table 4, we can also observe that the coefficients of demographic controls in the regression. The results are largely consistent with findings in existing literatures. For example, Column(1) and Column(2) show lower support for the Republican Party amongfemales and the Black. Column(3) shows higher degree of conservativeness among married respondents. These results all correspond to existing literatures thus giving validity to the data.

The most rigorous regression includes both the time and industry fixed effects as well as demographic controls (Table 4). Hence, in the subsequent sections, we will only explain results in Table 4 in detail. To see all regression results, please refer to the Withit the the the appendix. ute the the

#### Support For the Republican Party 5.1

Column (1) presents the DID regression results on whether the respondents perceive themselves to be Republican. The result indicates positive coefficient for the DID term statistically significant at 0.01 significance level. The values of the coefficient of interest is 0.036, which means there is a 3.6% relative increase in support for the Republican Party in manufacture industries after China joining WTO, compared to their nonmanufacture counterparts. The coefficient is economically significant as its magnitude hitule # # \*\* is comparable to the coefficient representing difference in support for the Republican

Party between male and female(-0.038), which is often considered substantial.

Column (2) shows the DID results on whether the respondents voted the republican candidate in presidential elections, which is another indicator of the respondents' party affiliation. The value of the coefficient of interest is 0.012, indicating that the respondents in manufacture industries experience 11.2% more increase in vote for Republican after 2001 compared to their non-manufacture counterparts. The results on election vote are largely consistent with the results on self-perceived party affiliation, except that the degree of change is larger in the latter. uto the HA B PR 加他新林道院 stitute the the 's

#### Conservativeness 5.2

institute the th

titute the the

tute the the

Column (3) presents the regression results on the degree of conservativeness. The values of the coefficient of interest is 0.029, significant at 0.01 significance level. This result builtute ## # '\$ corresponds well to the results on party affiliation, as the Republican Party is based on conservatism.

#### Support for Redistribution 5.3

Column (4) presents the results on support for government improving the standard of living of the poor. The value of the coefficient of interest is -0.036, indicating that respondents in manufacture industries experience 3.6% less increase in support for government improving the standard of living of the poor. Column (5) shows the results on support for reducing income inequality. The coefficient is -0.035 significant at 0.01significance level. Column (6) shows the results on support for improving social security. The coefficient of interest is -0.009. However, as will be shown in section 6.1.2, the parallel trend of this indicator is weak. Hence, we must be cautious when drawing conclusion with regard to the support for improving social security.

The values of the coefficient of interest of all three variables regarding redistribution are consistently negative, which gives strong evidence that workers in manufacture industries experience less increase in support for redistribution compared to workers in non-manufacture industries. This result is consistent with previous results, as conservaitute ## tives are generally less supportive of redistribution policies, while conservative attitude

is a characteristic of the Republican Party.

multine m M 3

multine # \*\* \*

millitute # # 3

面动地推荡举

面动地推荡举

mininte # # 3 PC

面动机机物带样等除

to the the the

multille # # 3 PR

而如此此教教

面动油油

mutilite # # '3 PR

to the We B Ph

## stitute ## # 3 PR **PCA Left-wing Indicator** 5.4

All previous results point to a rightward shift on the political spectrum among workers 面动地地称林塔 in manufacture industries. This is confirmed by the regression results on the PCA Leftwing Indicator as shown in Column(7). The coefficient of interest is -0.118 significant at 0.01 significance level, indicating a relative rightward shift in political ideologies among workers in manufacture industries.

multine m \*\* \*

multilite m # 3

而就批批新林客院

而知道机能教林谱院

面动曲线新祥等除

面对加限新林谱像

Mustime # # 3 PR

1. # # 13 1%

multine # \*\* \*

Institute 新林塔梯

multille # # 3 PE

multille # # 3 PR

而知道相比教育林谱院

mutilite \$5 # 3 PR

to the the B

mutute ## # 'E The main results are unexpected and counter-intuitive. Intuitively, as manufacture industries are negatively impacted by import competition, political ideologies of the workers should shift leftward in favour of more government intervention and redistribupossible explanations for the main results. tion policy. However, we obtain the opposite results. In the next section, we will discuss multilite # # 13 PR

而以此此称林塔路

而知道相比統世等際

mutute # # 3 PR

面动机机精带样等除

而就批批教林等院

面动机能称样等除

multille # # 3 PR

18 18 18

to the st. B. P.

城长楼梯	(2)	PC	-0.141**	(0.054)	-0.011	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	0.037	18922	nd after 2001 EL stands fo
Institute At	(9)	NATSOC	-0.016	(0.012)	0.759	Yes	Yes	0.023	37327	ndustries before an ublican Party". I
c Controls	(5)	EQW	$-0.041^{***}$	(0.014)	0.566	Yes	Yes	0.021	28123	on-manufacture in port For the Rep "D
Demographi	(4)	HELPP	-0.042***	(0.014)	0.521	${ m Yes}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	0.022	27138	unufacture and no If-Perceived Supj
a Without	(3)	POL	$0.034^{***}$	(0.010)	0.532	Yes	Yes	0.012	46282	ogies among ma nt variable "Sel
Regression	(2)	EL	0.015	(0.018)	0.478	Yes	Yes	0.052	45880	for dependent
le 3: DID I	(1)	PARTY	$0.041^{***}$	(0.015)	0.415	🗞 Yes	Yes	0.021	43652	on results for p ARTY stands
Institute # # Sig		ent Variable:	)1 * Manufacture	W.	ent Varaible Mean	FE .		a) D	of Observations	e reports DID OLS regressi od is from 1978 to 2018. F
mytitute ## #~ -	Inst	Depende	After200	AV A	Depende	Industry	Year FE	R square	Number	Notes: Table Sample perio

ы Left-wing Indicator". The first coefficient is our DID term of interest, an interaction of a PostWTO dummy with a Manufacture Industry dummy. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at two-digit industry level are shown below coefficients. \*, \*\*\* and \*\*\*\* signify statistical significance at 0.1, dependent variable "Election Vote For the Republican Party". POL stands for dependent variable "Degree of Conservativeness". HELPP stands for dependent variable "Support For Improving Standard of Living of the Poor". EQW stands for dependent variable "Support For Reducing Income Inequality". NATSOC stands for dependent variable "Support For Improving National Security". PC stands for dependent variable "PCA inte # \*\*\* itute \$ # 13 tute ## # 'S 加他新祥资幣 

		NA	9	0)	0	r	r
c Controls	(5)	EQW	$-0.041^{***}$	(0.014)	0.566	Yes 🗞	Yes
Demographi	(4)	HELPP	-0.042***	(0.014)	0.521	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\gamma_{es}$
Without	(3)	POL	$0.034^{***}$	(0.010)	0.532	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes
Regression	(2)	EL	0.015	(0.018)	0.478	Yes	Yes
le 3: DID	(1)	PARTY	$0.041^{***}$	(0.015)	50.415	🏂 Yes	Yes
Taby # Will	ints'	int Variable:	1 * Manufacture	Nr. a	nt Varaible Mean	FE	
太 次		de	00	<u>~</u> ₩	de	ry	Ē

multint # \*\* \*

Institute # # 13

institute # # 'S

multille # \*\*

mutute # \*\*\*

multille # # 13

Multille # # \* \*

multille # # \* \*

mutute # # \* \*

\*\*\*\*\*\*

multille # \*\*\*

to the shift the

multine # \*\* \*

matilute # # '3

multille # # 3

minitule # # '3

I

militute # # 3

matine to the Star

millittle # 25 3

multille # # '3

militute # # 3

matilut # # '3

mutule # # 'S

mutilite # \*\*

mutute # \*\*\*

matilite # # '3

面对机能称样谱梯

mininte # # \* \*

mutule # # \* \*

本体後代

mutule # # \* \*

大学学家

加加加格教林塔飛 19

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

misitute # # '3

\*\*\*\*\*\*

YK.	multille ## # 'S R	mistitute	<b>泰<sup>庆发 化</sup></b>	前期称林塔梯	而以此此 燕 林 塔	え masimute 新林 若	R matine the to the the
YK.	We the the the the	(7) PC	-0.118** (0.047) 0.015*** (0.004) -0.000***	(0.000) $0.225^{***}$ (0.041) $-0.026^{***}$ (0.009)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.945^{***} \\ (0.039) \\ 0.365^{***} \\ (0.037) \\ -0.258^{***} \end{array}$	(0.023) -0.011 Yes Yes 0.150 18806	er 2001. Sample sendent variable bendent variable lity". NATSOC ator". The first ohic controls not are shown below
	tinstitute sa	(6) NATSOC	$\begin{array}{c} -0.009 \\ (0.012) \\ 0.008^{***} \\ (0.001) \\ -0.000^{***} \end{array}$	(0.000) $0.057^{***}$ (0.005) $-0.012^{***}$ (0.001)	0.080*** (0.006) -0.016** (0.007) -0.011***	(0.003) 0.759 Yes Yes 0.075 37128	ies before and aft EL stands for der P stands for der g Income Inequa Left-wing Indica litional demogra it industry level a
YL.	Controls 2, 24 20 milling	(5) EQW	-0.035*** (0.013) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000	$\begin{array}{c} (0.000) \\ 0.048^{***} \\ (0.009) \\ -0.012^{***} \\ (0.002) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.131^{***} \\ (0.010) \\ 0.065^{***} \\ (0.011) \\ -0.026^{***} \end{array}$	(0.000) 0.566 Yes Yes 0.071 27912	aufacture industra unblican Party". iveness". HELP oort For Reducin, t variable "PCA try dummy. Add try dummy. Add tering at two-dig tering at two-dig
YK.	moeranhic (	(4) HELPP	-0.036*** (0.012) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.000***	(0.000) 0.031*** (0.007) -0.008*** (0.02)	0.167*** (0.010) 0.060*** (0.011) -0.027**	$\begin{array}{c} (0.000) \\ 0.521 \\ \mathrm{Yes} \\ \mathrm{Yes} \\ 0.086 \\ 26873 \end{array}$	ure and non-man port For the Rep pree of Conservat t variable "Supp ds for dependent anufacture Indus adjusted for clus ectively.
	De With De	(3) (3)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.029^{***} \\ (0.010) \\ 0.004^{***} \\ (0.001) \\ -0.000^{***} \end{array}$	(0.000) -0.018*** (0.006) -0.005*** (0.002)	-0.090*** (0.008) -0.051*** (0.008) 0.067***	(0.004) 0.532 Yes Yes 0.045 45665	among manufact aff-Perceived Sup nt variable "Deg dds for dependen nrity". PC stan ummy with a M Standard errors d 0.01 level resp
YK.	ID Reressi	(2) EL	$\begin{array}{c} 0.012 \\ (0.017) \\ 0.000 \\ (0.001) \\ 0.000 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.000) \\ -0.028^{***} \\ (0.008) \\ -0.002 \\ (0.002) \end{array}$	$-0.453^{***}$ (0.008) $-0.201^{***}$ (0.014) 0.064^{***}	(0.000) 0.478 Yes 0.170 45880	litical ideologies lent variable "Sc ands for depender or". EQW star ig National Secu of a PostWTO d ncome dummy. ie at 0.1, 0.05 an
YK.	Table 4: D	(1) PARTY	$\begin{array}{c} 0.036^{**} \\ (0.016) \\ -0.006^{***} \\ (0.001) \\ 0.000^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.000) \\ -0.038^{***} \\ (0.009) \\ 0.005^{**} \\ (0.002) \end{array}$	-0.353*** (0.009) -0.174*** (0.013) 0.059***	(0.000) 0.415 Yes Yes 0.107 43027	sion results of po trands for depend arty". POL stan Living of the Po ort For Improvit an interaction of my and family i istical significanc
	mstitute av	iable:	anufacture	tion Year	Institute A.	aible Mean	DID OLS regress 2018. PARTY s te Republican P. ng Standard of variable "Suppo term of interest, thde region dum *** signify stati
YK.	mutute # # '\$ R	Dependent Var	After2001 * M Age Age Square	Female Highest Educa	Race(Black) Race(Others) Married	Dependent Vaı Industry FE Year FE R square Number of Ob	Notes: Table reports beriod is from 1978 to Election Vote For th Support For Improvi- tands for dependent oefficient is our DID hown in the table inc oefficients. *, ** and
Y.	multinte ## # '\$ PA	<b>ETASIANT</b>	频 <sup>换 浅 悦</sup>	前加度新林塔梯	20 20	K Maritule A # 'S	M A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A

multitute ## # \*

西法资税

西苏安徽

multitute # # \*

matitute # # 3

matinte # # \*

multitute # # \*

matitute # # 3

西法法院

西法婆院

西苏资税

\*\*\*\*\*\*

#### Discussion 6

stitute ## # 3

multille m X 3

mailule # # 'S

mistitute ## #

mistime # #

tasitute ##

的前期的教授

within the the the PR

matinu # # ' K

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

#### Validity of Assumption 6.1

mutilite m # 3

One possible explanation for the counter-intuitive main results is that our identification assumptions are not valid. In this section, we check our two main assumptions: First, manufacture industries are more severely impacted by import competition than other industries; second, the trends of ideological change between manufacture and non-manufacture industries are parallel before 2001. We confirm that both assumpbuiltute # # 13 1% tions hold.

muiture ## # \*

withte # # \*

matinte # # \*

matine # # 3 PC

multille m # 3

面射机机称林塔梯

mutute # # B

Astitute # # 13 1%

Astitute ## # 13 1%

小 按 按 後 第

### 6.1.1 Relative Income Drop in Manufacture Industry

Previously we have been citing other literatures to support that manufacture industry has been severely impacted by China's accession to the WTO. Here, we confirm the differential changes of income level between manufacture and non-manufacture industries using our own dataset from the General Social Survey. The results are shown in Table  $\mathbf{5}$ 

Table 5: DID Regression of Relative Income Change of Manufacture Industries 而知道机能教林等院 ANIANA MAY 13 12 

			45
- Xt	G	Individual Income	170
Part aline.	After * Manufacture	-2,486.241**	
mstillue	mastlue mastlu	(1,111.292)	
	Manu Inc bef 2001	26681.979	
	Percentage Change	-9.31%	
	Dependent Varaible Mean	30363.467	
No.	Industry FE	Yes	1
www.	Year FE	Yes W	
the state of the second	Demographic Controls	Yes	
	R square	0.394	
	Number of Observations	32353	

Notes: Table reports DID OLS regression results of income change of manufacture industries before and after 2001. Sample period is from 1978 to 2018. Individual income is winsorized to exclude individuals with top and bottom 5% income. The first coefficient is our DID term of interest, an interaction of a PostWTO dummy with a Manufacture Industry dummy. Demographic controls include age, age square, sex, marital status, highest year of education, race and region dummy. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at two-digit industry level are shown below coefficients. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* signify statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. withthe the the the press withte the the to the

21

小林 林 後 像

而当此相思新林塔

1. 按林 後 9%

xitute 称林 塔

"你放送

multille # # \* Table 5 shows that the value of coefficient of interest is -2486.2 at 5% significance level, indicating that China's accession to WTO causes the individual year income of manufacture industries to decrease by 2486.2 dollars (9.31%) relative to non-manufacture industries. The result shows that the manufacture industry is more severely impacted by Withthe ## # 13 PR China's accession to the WTO compared to other industries. Hence our first assumption tute \$ The state

maxitute # \*\* \*

multille # # \*

multilite m # 3

面影曲服務報告

而知道相思教教学学院

西林省

Astitute ## # '\$ 1%

Withit the star of the

\*\*\*\*\*

Withit # \*\* \*

stands.

Millittle # # 3

mistitute ##

mistitute ###

mutitute ## #

Avitate # \*\*\*\*

Withte the the to the

Millitute # # '\$ PE

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

#### **Parallel Trends** 6.1.2

面动油油

面动机能称样等除

~ 资本

Withit # \*\*

As stated in section 3.1, our identification assumption is parallel trends between the manufacture and non-manufacture industries without the event of China joining WTO. The assumption can be verified by observing graphs of political ideology changes of the two groups. To reduce the volatility of the results as a result of the small sample size of each year, we plot the graph for every four years. The y-axis represents various political ideologies; the x-axis represents year. The graphs are shown in Figure 2.

All graphs except graph (f) show good parallel trends before China's accession to the WTO in year 2001. This indicates that our identification assumption of parallel trends before 2001 in our identification strategy is valid. In all graphs except graph (f), there is an obvious kink around year 2001 where the manufacture group shows differential changes from the non-manufacture group. We have taken into account the lack of parallel trend in graph (f) and have been cautious in drawing conclusion regarding support for improving social security. Hence our second assumption stands. institute ## # '& PK 而时间的新林婆際 面明明那样落像 

而就他能統推著際

加加加格林塔梯

22

面动机能称林塔

而就机能精祥等除

面动曲线新祥等除

西林诸

## 6.2 Mechanism of Results

tasitute #####

itute the state

tute the the

Given that our assumptions are valid, we will explain the main results using heterogeneity studies, the methodology of which is explained in section 4.2. We will explain how China's accession to WTO has heterogeneous impact on different subgroups within manufacture industries, thus exploring how different subgroups contribute to the general rightward shift of political ideologies in manufacture industries.

## 6.2.1 Heterogeneous Impact on Political Ideologies of Low-Income and High-Income Workers

We first examines the heterogeneous effect of import competition on low-income and high-income manufacture employees. Table 6 presents the regression results of the heterogeneity studies.

Column (1) shows regression results on self-perceived support for Republican Party of the low-income and the high-income subgroups. The coefficient of the DID interaction term of the high-income subgroup is 0.075 at 0.01 significance level. The corresponding coefficient of the low-income subgroup is -0.010. This indicates that the relative rise in support for the Republican Party is mostly contributed by the high-income manufacture subgroup; the low-income subgroup even experiences a slight relative decrease in support for the Republican Party. Column (2) shows the heterogeneity studies results on whether the respondents voted the republican candidate in presidential elections. The results correspond well to the results in Column (1), with coefficient 0.033 for the high-income subgroup and 0.00 for the low-income subgroup. The results of Column (1) and Column (2) collectively show that import competition from China causes a polarisation of party affiliation between the low-income and high-income manufacture employees, with lowincome employees becoming more supportive of the Democratic Party and high-income employees more supportive of the Republican Party.

Column(3) shows that the relative increase in conservativeness of the high-income manufacture subgroup(0.045) is higher than that of the low-income subgroup(0.014). Also, the result on the high-income subgroup is significant at 0.01 significance level while the result on the low-income subgroup is not statistically significant. This indicates that

the relative rise in conservativeness of the manufacture group is mainly contributed by the high-income group. This result correspond well with the results on party affiliation, as conservative attitude is a characteristic of the Republican Party.

而以注册 称 环 3

institute \$7 \$7 5

Astitute ## # 18

Withit the the the the

Institute the the 'S PK

Astitute # # \*\* \*\*

muiture ## # \*

multille 称 X 3

multille # \*\* \*

Withing the the

mittille ###

tasitute # #

Astitute the the

thinthe the the

withthe #######

stitute ## # 13 PE

the star st

~ 资本

mistille m # 's

matinte # # \* \*

Assitute ## # 'S PR

Column(4) shows relative decrease in support for government helping the poor among both the high-income manufacture subgroup(-0.044) and a relative increase among the low-income subgroup(0.012). Column(5) shows substantial relative decrease in support for reducing income inequality among the high-income manufacture subgroup (-0.045) and slight increase among the low-income subgroup (0.011). Column(4) and Column(5) collectively show a polarisation in support for redistribution policies between the highincome and the low-income subgroups. This is consistent with previous results on party affiliation and conservativeness.<sup>6</sup>

Previous results point to a rightward shift of political ideologies among the highincome manufacture employees and a leftward shift among the low-income manufacture employees. This is confirmed by regression results on PCA Left-wing indicator, as shown in Column (7). The coefficient of the high-income subgroup is -0.171 while the coefficient of the low-income subgroup is 0.033, indicating that high-income workers shift right on the political spectrum while the low-income workers shift left.

Hence, the results suggest that China's accession to WTO causes polarisation of political ideologies between low-income and high-income manufacture employees.

antitute ## # '\$ 1%

astitute ## # 'S PK

antitute ## # '\$ 1%

minitute # # # B

<sup>6</sup>The results in Column (6) are statistically insignificant hence do not impact conclusions drawn previously.



multing # \*\* \*\*

TURNITUR W X 3

multine m M 3

militute # # \*

TURNITUR W X 3

multitute mark "

新教	Employees	(2)	PC	-0.171**	(0.082)	0.033	(0.085)	-0.011	Yes	Yes	Yes	0.153	13334	an Party". EL
<b>Enstitute</b>	lanufacture	(9)	NATSOC	0.003	(0.014)	-0.024	(0.022)	0.759	Yes	Yes	Yes	0.077	26197	r the Republics
matine # #	n-Income N	(5)	EQW	-0.043**	(0.020)	0.011	(0.024)	0.566	Yes	Yes	Yes	0.071	19846	ed Support Fo
- W	ne and Higl	(4)	HELPP	-0.044**	(0.018)	0.012	(0.026)	0.521	Yes	Yes	Yes	0.085	19047	le "Self-Perceiv
Institute &	of Low-Incon	(3)	POLVIEW	0.045***	(0.016)	0.015	(0.018)	0.532	Yes	Yes	Yes	0.050	32322	dependent variab
mostilute ## # **	ldeologies c	(2)	EL	0.033	(0.031)	0.003	(0.027)	0.478	Yes	Yes	Yes	0.179	30399	Y stands for
1111	1 Political	(1)	PARTY	$0.072^{***}$	(0.025)	-0.006	(0.020)	0.415	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	0.115	29417	o 2018. PART
mutitute ## 47 93	elative Changes in	listit	t Variable:	* RichManu 🚿	¥.	* PoorManu	P	t Varaible Mean	ohic Controls	E a	×.		f Observations	e period is from 1978 t
multille # **	lable 6: Ré	Column	Dependen	After2001	於	After2001		Dependen	Demograp	Industry I	Year FE	R square	Number o	Notes: Sample

multint # \*\* \*

matine # \* \* \*

matitute # # 3

matine # # 18 18

multint # \*\* \*

muiture # # \* \*

For Reducing Income Inequality". NATSOC stands for dependent variable "Support For Improving National Security". PC stands for dependent variable "PCA Left-wing Indicator". The first and second coefficients are our DID terms of interest. The first coefficient is an interaction of a PostWTO dummy with a High-Income Manufacture dummy. The second coefficient is an interaction of a PostWTO dummy with a Low-Income Manufacture dummy. Demographic controls include age, age square, sex, marital status, highest year of education, race, family income dummy Manufacture dummy. Demographic controls include age, age square, sex, marital status, highest year of education, race, family income dummy and region dummy. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at two-digit industry level are shown below coefficients. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* signify statistical HELPP stands for dependent variable "Support For Improving Standard of Living of the Poor". EQW stands for dependent variable "Support stands for dependent variable "Election Vote For the Republican Party". POL stands for dependent variable "Degree of Conservativeness" multille to the Service of the servi Multille # # # K mutute # # \* \* muiture # # \* \* significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 而时间的新林等席 matilute ## # # K

militute # \*\* \*

matine to the Star

militute # \*\* \*

matine to the 'S the

millitte # # 3

matine # # 18 18

matine # # \* \*

mating the ter the the

matine # # 18 18

面动机机称林谱梯

muiture # # \* \* \*

mutule # # \* \*

multille # # 'S PK

本体後代

multilite # # 3 PE

to the the B

multille # # 'S PK institute # # #

F

matine # # \* \*

大学家

to the state the

西北市林塔张 26

小学学家の

小学学家

## mailule # # 'S 6.2.2Heterogeneous Impact on Income of Low-Income and High-Income Workers

multilite # \*\* \*

mistille m # 3

multilite m # \*

Multille # # 3 PR

\*\* 's %

"你状况

TUNITUR # \*\* \*

Millittle # # 3

mistinte ##

maximue ## # #

thinthe the the

stitute \$10 th

"你放法"多

~ 振秋

Withit # \*\*

The polarisation of political ideologies between high-income and low-income workers within manufacture industries may be caused by the polarisation of income level. To confirm this hypothesis, we study the heterogeneous effect of import competition on the individual year income of the two subgroups. The regression results are shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Relative Income Change of Low-Income and High-Income Manufacture multilite # # 3 PR 面动机机称林塔 Subgroups

	- W	
and all all all all all all all all all al	Individual Income	A.
After2001 * RichManu	9,557.068***	-
	(1, 436.448)	
After2001 * PoorManu	$-16,299.954^{***}$	
627 627	(1,572.189)	A30
Manu Inc bef 2001	26810.671	W B
Number of Observations	32353	W.
Dependent Varaible Mear	n 30715.796	
Industry FE	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	
Demographic Controls	Yes	
R square	0.408	1/2 VA
<i>太子 松水</i>	· · · · · ·	₩ '3
at atitute the same	tute and intuite	
	AL MORE	

而知此他就样等除 面动曲线新林塔梯 The coefficient before the DID term of the high-income subgroup is 9557, while that of the low-income subgroup is -16299. This indicates that import competition from China causes the income of high-income manufacture employees to increase by 9557 dollars relative to non-manufacture workers. Import competition also causes the income of low-income manufacture employees to decrease by 16299 dollars relative to non-manufacture workers.

Given that the median manufacture income before 2001 is 26810 dollars, the polarisation of income between the low-income and high-income workers as a result of import competition is huge. Hence, the polarisation of political ideologies with manufacture industries can probably be explained by the polarisation of income level. maxitute # # 3 PR maritule ## # 'S PE 而以此此教林等院 的前期代新花生活院 Astitute ## # 18 18 multille # # 3 PR

27

"你孩子

小林 林 楼 像

大学学

#### inte sta sk 6.2.3Heterogeneous Impact on Political Ideologies of Workers Experiencing Different Income Change

msitute ###

mistille # # 3

institute ## #

htitute # #

itute # #

inte wark

itute # # #

"你来

withthe # \*\*

To confirm that the polarisation of political ideologies within manufacture industries is caused by the polarisation of income, we conduct heterogeneous studies on the political ideologies of workers experiencing different levels of income change (as opposed to absolute income level). Due to the lack of individual panel data, we use income change of all workers in each different geographic region as a proxy. The results are shown in Table 8.

Column (1) shows the correlation between self-perceived support for Republican Party and income change. The coefficient of interest is 0.084 at 1% significance level. This means for every unit of income rise, there is a 8.4% relative increase in self-perceived support for the Republican Party. Column (2) presents the correlation between election vote for the Republican Party and income change. The coefficient of interest is 0.046 at 1% significance level, meaning for every unit of income rise, there is a 4.6% relative increase in selection vote for the Republican Party. Column (1) and Column (2) collectively show that there is a positive correlation between support for the Republican Party and income rise.

Column (3) shows the correlation between degree of conservativeness and income change. The coefficient of interest is 0.071 at 1% significance level. This means for every unit of income rise, there is a 7.1% relative increase in degree of conservativeness. This result shows a positive correlation between degree of conservativeness and income rise. This is consistent with the results of Column (1) and Column (2), as support for the Republican party is usually related to higher degree of conservativeness.

Column (4), (5), and (6) present the results on support for improving standard of living of the poor, support for reducing income inequality and support for improving social security respectively. The coefficient of interests are -0.043, -0.030 and -0.013 for Column(4), (5), and (6) respectively. The negative coefficients shown in the three columns signify a negative correlation between income rise and and support for redistribution. Millitte # # 13 18 Withte the the to the withte the the 's the

28

Autitute ## # 'S

matine # \* \* \* Column (7) presents regression results on PCA Left-wing Indicator. The negative efficient (-0.298) shows negative correlation between income size and the coefficient (-0.298) shows negative correlation between income rise and leftward shift of

matitute # # 3

multitute # # 3

matine to the B

institute ## # #

institute # # # K

面动机能称状姿体

mstitute # # 'S PE

面动机能称状谱像

小小学家

millitute # # 3

matine # # # R

institute # # # 12

institute # # # K

而的加加非教教

multilitte # 13 PR

mutitule # # # B

to the the the

matitute # # 3

mating to the B

而如此此能称样等除

而以此此教教

Multille # # 3 PS

面动曲线新祥等席

matinue # # # #

小林楼

matitute ## #

institute # # # K

institute # # # K

institute # # # #

面动机机物样等除

面动机机物状等除

Institute # # B

millitte # # 3

institute # # # K

institute # # # 12

institute # # # K

institute ## # # #

面动机机新林等除

institute # # # K

Lo the We B PR

These results confirm that income rise correlates with rightward shift of political ideologies while income drop correlates with leftward shift of political results grant validite. ideologies while income drop correlates with leftward shift of political ideologies. The results grant validity to our previous findings mstitute

而如此服務林塔梯

Institute # # '& P&

Institute # # B

面动机机能新林谱院

matter to the second

antitute the the 'S the

to the the B

	Institute	W.	( <u>k</u>	mstitute	<b>振</b> 沃 '3	Institute	频沃 3	mistille # ***	maxitute # # 3 .	Institute # ** **	institute.
2	Institute	城水	13 Ph	mstitute	频读成学	tinstitute	瘀 <sup>沃 沒 邻</sup>	Institute ## # 'S	K Maritule An # 'S P	E the state of the	10 stitute
	mstitute	the state	ncome Change	soc PC	$\begin{array}{rrrr} 113 & -0.298^{***} \\ 111) & (0.087) \\ 59 & -0.011 \end{array}$	es Yes es Yes es Yes	67 0.129 .28 18806	maxitute ## # 3	K Maritute ## # 'S P	E Mastitute # # 13	R.
<b>%</b> .	mstitute	茶茶	encing Different I	(5) (6) EQW NAT	$^{\circ}$ -0.030* -0.0 (0.019) (0.0 0.567 0.7	Yes Yo Yes Yo Yes Yo	0.056 0.0 27912 371	TUStitute ## # 'S P	発 Intritute 称林塔	E matitute # # *	R.
<i>4</i> 0	Institute	· 新 家	of Workers Experi	(3) (4) POL HELPP	$\begin{array}{ccccc} 0.071^{***} & -0.043^{**} \\ (0.016) & (0.017) \\ 0.534 & 0.518 \end{array}$	Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes	$\begin{array}{c} 0.038 & \implies 0.069 \\ 41310 & \implies 25751 \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ &$	mistilute ## # 13	K Maritule ## # ** *	E matitute # ***	R.
<b>%</b> 5	Mistitute	See No.	ditical Ideologies e	(2) TY III EL	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Yes Yes	)4 0.164 28 38494	mistitute # # * *	K Martine # # ** *	E Maritute # # **	R.
<b>%</b> 0	Mistitute	W. W.	ive Changes in Pc	(1) able: PAR	change 0.084 (0.01 uble Mean 0.42	relation of the second	brvations 0.10	mistitute ## # #	K Martinte # # * *	R Maritute # # 'S f	R.
<b>%</b> .	Mistitute	W. W.	Table 8: Relat	Column Dependent Varia	After2001 * Inc Dependent Vara	Demographic Co Industry FE Year FE	R square Number of Obse	mistitute # # **	K Mastinte # # * *	E Maritute # # 'S f	R.
20	Mistitute	城	13 Vil	Institute	新水水等	matitute	\$\$. <sup>\$\$</sup>	Tasilitte # # 3 P	K Mastinte # # * *	E Maritute # # 13	R.
<b>%</b> .	10	资料	13 <sup>196</sup>	10	振荡等	2	频法戏邻	物林塔	彩 加频 <sup>张·接</sup> 管	h 如 频 按 K	<b>%</b> 5

## Conclusion

institute # \*

mistime ###

mstitute # #

Withit the star st

itute the the

前加加蘇林塔

This paper examines the effect of import competition from China on U.S. political ideologies using the U.S. General Social Survey Data. We treat China's accession to WTO in 2001 as a natural experiment in income competition. We examine the differential impact of China's accession to WTO on the political ideologies of manufacture and non-manufacture industries using difference-in-differences specification. We consider political ideologies including party affiliation, degree of conservativeness and attitudes towards redistribution. We also examine the heterogeneous effect of import competi-探<sup>谈</sup>浅 tion from China on manufacture subgroups with different levels of income, as well as subgroups experiencing differential change in income.

tinstitute the the

频<sup>读 '孩 %</sup>

We find that manufacture industries, which are more exposed to import competition from China, experienced a relative rightward shift of political ideologies after China's accession to WTO. This is manifested in a relative increase in support for the Republican Party, a relative increase in degree of conservativeness, as well as a relative decrease in support for redistribution policies. Our PCA indicator also shows a rightward shift of political ideologies among manufacture employees. Through further heterogeneity studies, we find that Chinese competition causes low-income manufacture employees to shift left on the political spectrum and high-income employees to shift right. Meanwhile, we also find that low-income manufacture employees experience a substantial income drop after China's accession to WTO, while the high-income employees experience a significant income rise. Hence, the polarisation in political ideologies between high-income and low-income manufacture employees is probably due to income polarisation. Our heterogeneity studies on manufacture employees experiencing different levels of income change confirm our previous proposition. Our results show that workers experiencing severer income drop shift left on the political spectrum while workers experiencing higher income rise shift right on the political spectrum.

Hence, we can conclude that import competition from China results in a polarisation in political ideologies between high-income and low-income U.S. workers, which is in turn caused by a polarisation in income. 的前期的教授 stitute # # 'S PK Withte the the to the matinte # \*\* mutute # # \*\*

matine # \* \* The research can be improved if individual level panel data are available. Without anel data, our research suffers from the selection problem of sub-· /2 % panel data, our research suffers from the selection problem of who stays in manufacture industries given increasing import competition from China. Nevertheless, our research still gives a realistic picture regarding workers within manufacture industries. 而這個世界 ··· F St K K unititute # # # institute # # # 12

matitute # # 3

而如此服務林塔梯

面的抽版教教後

而這個世界

面动机机能新林谱院

面动动物的新林等梯

Tanitute ## 13 1%

大学家

32

multitute # # 3

面动机机能称林谱梯

institute ## # # #

matine # # B

面动机机精精学

面动机机能带样等除

面动机机物状等除

\*\*\*\*\*\*

multitute # # 3

matine # # # R

Institute # # B

institute # # # K

而的加加非教教

multilitte # 13 PR

multilitte # # 13 PK

大学家

matitute # # 3

Institute # # 18

matitute # # # B

而以此此教教

面动机机器带样谱除

Institute # # 3 PE

matinue # # # #

小小学家

matitute ## # 3

institute # # #

mailule # # 3 PE

面动机机物带带等除

而时间推荐林客席

面动机机物状等除

institute # # # #

Tanitute # # 3

matinte # # # R

institute # # # 12

institute # # # 18

面动机机统林等降

面动机机统状等除

面动机机物带带等除

to the We B

## References

mistime the the

面站油根都林塔

Astitute ## #

matinte ## #

stitute the the

stitute the the

stitute the the

litute ####

stitute # # 'S PR

~ ~ ~

withte the the the

stitute # # 'S PR

Aradhyula, S. V., Rahman, T., & Seenivasan, K. (2007). Impact of international trade on income and income inequality (Tech. Rep.).

mistilule ####

柳林海绵

stitute \$ # 13 PR

stitute # # 13 PK

mistille # #

Autor, D. (2018). Trade and labor markets: Lessons from china's rise. IZA World of Labor.

Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G., Majlesi, K., et al. (2016). Importing political polarization? the electoral consequences of rising trade exposure (No. w22637). National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, MA.

Autor, D., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2013). The china syndrome: Local labor market effects of import competition in the united states. American Economic *Review*, 103(6), 2121-68.

Bloom, N., Handley, K., Kurmann, A., & Luck, P. (2019). The impact of chinese trade on us employment: The good, the bad, and the apocryphal. In American economic association annual meetings (Vol. 2019).

Brambilla, I., Khandelwal, A. K., & Schott, P. K. (2010). China's experience under the multi-fiber arrangement (mfa) and the agreement on textiles and clothing (atc). In *China's growing role in world trade* (pp. 345–387). University of Chicago Press.

Che, Y., Lu, Y., Pierce, J. R., Schott, P. K., & Tao, Z. (2016). Does trade liberalization with china influence us elections? (Tech. Rep.). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Chen, C. (2009). China's integration with the global economy: Wto accession, foreign direct investment and international trade. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Margalit, Y. (2011). Costly jobs: Trade-related layoffs, government compensation, and voting in us elections. American Political Science Review, 105(1), 166-188.

Pierce, J. R., & Schott, P. K. (2016). The surprisingly swift decline of us manufacturing employment. American Economic Review, 106(7), 1632–62.

Shafaeddin, S. (2002). Some implications of accession to wto for china's economy'. International Journal of Development Issues, 1(2), 93–128. within the the the file within the the 's PR Withthe # # 18

33

Withit the the the the

withit the the the

stitute # # \* \* \*

### multing # \*\* \*\* multine m \*\* \* multine m M 3 multille m # 3 TURNITUR W X 3 multine m M 3 msitute # # 3 PS S Nithill MA # 'S PS plinte # # 18 PR avitute the the the Institute # # '3 Appendix institute Table 9: Category Labels of Demographic Variables Variable Category Label 面如前的 Female 0=Male 1=Female matine # # \* 0=Non-black 1=Black Race(black) 0=Black or White 1=Race Other than Black and White $Race(others)^{\dagger}$ Total House-1=Lt \$1000 2=\$1000 to 2999 3=\$3000 to 3999 4=\$4000 hold Income to 4999 5=\$5000 to 5999 6=\$6000 to 6999 7=\$7000 to 19999 11=\$20000 - 24999 12=\$25000 or more <sup>†</sup>The dummy variable for white race is the omitted group in the race variable. matitute # # B institute \* 面动机机物状等除 面动机机新林等降 mutute # # 3 PE Institute # # B mating # # B mating the to the second 面动机机物带带等除 面动机机统林等体 institute # # # # 而就机能称状姿体 面的挑批推新林塔梯 matina # \* \* \* mutilute # # B maximue ## # K institute ## # # Matilule # # # # maximue ## # 13 PK 而此此此恭林塔梯 Institute # # 13 PS mstitute # # 3 PS mistitute ## # B 面动油油的新林等席 mstitute # # 'S PS maximue # # ' K institute # # B mutitule # # B 面就加度新林塔像 matinue # # # B maxitute # # 'S PL Astitute ## # 13 PR 34

w w th to the the to th

h		城水地	1 Ph		<b>松</b>	13 Ph		w v	· 13 (1	6		家 次 が	8			松	€. <sup>4</sup>	19K		4	水	13 1	ß	
	Institute			uped Cat Label	emocratic epublican		emocratic		-	oeral mservative	stitute .	on't Sup 1=Support	· - - - - - - -	tinst	itute	on't Sup	1=Suppor		mstitu	m't Sup	1=Support			fistiti
<i>K</i>	ater.	柳水坊	AND A	Regroegory	- 0=De - 1=Re	B Pho	0=De	www.	: *% (	$1  0 = L_1$ $y  1 = C_c$	te	n 0=Dc	8		atn.	0=Dc	port,	A.		t 0=Dc	port	13 8	ß	• } \$
	mistillite		bles	Label	3=Inde republi		=Republi	le.	:	lıbera İxtremely		gree with selves		titist	11110C	ff, 7=NG				out righ				instit.
<i>K</i>	Ateric	海水坊	ent Varial	ategory I	democrat i=Strong	ner party	atic 2=	。 物 <sup>以</sup>	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~	ely T te 7=E	Ve	tion 3=A	4		ate.	educe di	ġ, Ż	A.	ter la	cle 2=Ab	ch	13 3	6	
	Institute		of Depende	Original C	0=Strong pendent 6	can 7=Oth	1=Democr		Ē	1=Extrem 4=Modera	conservativ	1=Govt ac both 5=Pe		finst	illine.	1=Govt r	govt action		Institu	1=Too litt	3=Too mu			<i>distill</i>
K	atitute	物水坊	y Labels o	stitute	rself as	13 Ph	. Presi- he Re-	u vote	*kg * <u>*</u>	olitical om ex-	point	tything Il poor	govern-	ld take	OII UIIS	rnment	ich and	rnment differ-	to the	le right	X	13 3	3	atit
			Categor	Moer	uk of you: or what?		A ran foi 3BB for t	. Did yc	5	h the p anged fre	nservativé his scale?	l do even ving of a	not the g	son shou	yoursen	the gove	etween ri	the gover z income	es closest	about th				
<b>%</b>	- withte	物水花	tions and	atitute	ually thir pendent,	13 VIN	that AA	lependent	<u>`</u> %` <u>*</u>	on whic l are arr	emely cor rself on t	on should ard of liv	ts "it is 1	each per	you place	ing that	erences b	ng that reducing	nd 7 com	little, or	水	13	<u>ل</u>	Actil
			vey Ques	Mos	o you us rat, Indej		emember tic ticket	as an Inc 3C?	-	nt scale ight holc	1-to extr place you	Washingt, the stand	represent	and that	re would	as mean	come diff.	7 meani tself with	tween 1 a	much, toc	urity?			
	and title	物水花	e 10: Sur	lion	eaking, d 1, Democ	B YNS	X, you r Democra	nd CCC 3B. or C(	13 VI	seven-pon people m	al-point and you ]	resents "V	point 5	usibility,	ally. Wile	core of 1	uce the ir	score of concern i	score bet	ding too 1	ocial Sec	13		astit
			Table	vey quest	epublicar	130	v in XXX t on the	olicans, a AAA, BI		s is a s vs that j	mely liber Where wo	nt 1 repi sible to j	ericans";	nt's respo	e or muse le?	nk of a s	ht to red	or, and a uld not c	es. What	we spend	ount on S			
	and stitute	柳林花	e pro	Sur	ed Ger For a R	is the	Nov Ote den	Re- pub for	K E	on- Thi s viev	trei	for Poi	of Am	the mer	oppul Scal	for Thi	oug	In- poc sho	enc	for Are	amo	ity		astit
<i>K</i>		. Y	N No.	Variable	Self-perceive Support 1	Republican Party	Presidential Flection V	For the ]	Candidate	Degree of C servativenes		Support Improving	Standard	Living of	FUOL	Support	Reducing	Income equality	- -	Support	Improving	Social Secur	R R	
	matitute	物外		institute	物於		mstitu	W W	~ ~ .	35	situte *	W.		finst	itute	物	pr	1	mstitu	s the	W.			nstit

Institute # \*\* \*

西铁湾像

西林诸佛

西法资献

Institute # # 3

Taritute # \*\* \*\*

Tastitute # \* 3

Tastitute # \*\* \*\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

西林诸佛

林凌佩

Tantitute # \*\* \*

Table	e 11: Eigenvecto	r of Principle Com	ponent	to the second se
tinstitute and the	Variable	Eigen Vector	mstitute 22	mistitute 200 .
	EL	-0.4587		
in the second se	POLVIEW	-0.4559	132.	
· where the state of the	HELPP	0.4892	NY BYN	W B VID
the and the second seco	EQW NATSOC	0.4843	withit and the	molitute #
	Notes: PARTV et	ands for dependent vari-		

militute # # 3

multine # \*\* \*\*

millitte # \*\* \*

matitute # # # B

institute # # #

matitute # # \* \*

matinute # # # 13 PR

minitule ## # 'S P&

matinute # # # B

Multinte # \*\* 'S

inditute the tet is the

matine # # B

Institute # # 13 PR

matinute # # # 18

matitute # # # #

matinte # # B PR

militute # # 3

institute the tet is the

institute the te 's the

institute the tet 's PL

matinute # # # B

mythille ## # 'E PE

Institute # # # B

matinte # # B

minitule # # 3 PE

minitule # # 3 PE

multille # # 3

Notes: PARTY stands for dependent variable "Self-Perceived Support For the Republican Party". EL stands for dependent variable "Election Vote For the Republican Party". POL stands for dependent variable "Degree of Conservativeness". HELPP stands for dependent variable "Support For Improving Standard of Living of the Poor". EQW stands for dependent variable "Support For Reducing Income Inequality". NATSOC stands for dependent variable "Support For Improving National Security".

mutule # # S K

multille # # \* \*

minitule # # 3 PE

mutule # # \* \*

mininte ## # B

minitule # # 3 PC

minimum ## # \* \*

Takitute # # \*\*\*\*

<b>X</b>	multilite ## # '\$ 1%	masine ## #	B PR	名 matitule 新 林 接 略	abitate ## # 3 PK	within the the the minimum
	multille ## # # #	an Party (5) $(6)0.038^{***} 0.037^{***}(0.000)$ $(0.000)$	-0.008* (0.001)	(0.000) -0.039*** (0.000) -0.005* (0.001) -0.189*** (0.00)	0.021 0.415 0.415 Yes Yes Yes Yes 0.021 0.087 43027 43027	within the tot the fill the second states of the second seco
2	mininte m # ' ?	port For Republic: (3) $(4)(.000)$ $(0.000)$	0.011 0.000) 0.004*** (0.000)	名 Interitute 新社·法代	1.415     0.415       No     Yes       Yes     No       1.008     0.014       13027     43027	stitute # # 13 PX
<b>%</b>	TUNITUR # # 'B PR	belf-perceived Sup (2) (2) (0.001) (0	$\begin{array}{c} ** & -0.013* \\ (0.002) \\ (0.001) \\ (0.000) \\ (0.001) \\ (0.001) \\ (0.001) \\ (0.000* \end{array}$	(0.000) - $0.048$ ** (0.001) 0.004* (0.001) - $0.190$ *** (0.000)	(0.001) (0.415 No No 0.075 4 43027 4	stitute # # ' K
<b>7</b> 5	而此此此称林塔梯	ssion Results on S $(1)$ $(0.000)$	-0.016** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)	M & A Multille	0.415 No 0.000 43027	withit # # 3 PK
<b>7</b> 5	而此此此称林塔梯	ole 12: DID Regre able: PARTY cture	we the the state of the state	ent c of Education Co ent	uble Mean	stitute # 13 1%
	multilite m # '& P	Tah Dependent Vari After * Manufa	Manufacture After2001 Age of Respond Age Square	Sex of Responde Highest Number race of responde Married	Dependent Vara Industry FE Year FE R square Number of Obse	withit # # # # M
2	面动机机能称林塔梯	mistille ## #	K MALINUL MA H 'S P	名 [[[]]]()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()	Withite # # 3 K	stitute # # 13 PX
K	如你你 "多邻	物族	ght the the the the the	化 斯林·洛 化	10 m # 落 %	· 资保

Institute # \*\* \*\*

Malitute # \*\* \*\*

Tastitute \$ 75 'S

Multille # \*\* \*\*

Tastitute # # "

Tastitute # # "



<i>K</i>	tastitute \$6 \$	K- 1/3 9%	mistime # * *	Maritune # # # #	Maritute # # * *	tinstitute ## # 18	matitute ## # 13 PS	Institut
Z.	minitute #####	- "3 %	$ \begin{array}{c} (6) \\ * 0.029^{***} \\ (0.010) \end{array} $	0.004*** (0.001) -0.000*** (0.000)	-0.018 (0.006) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.090*** (0.008) -0.051***	$\begin{array}{c} (0.008) \\ (0.008) \\ 0.067^{***} \\ (0.004) \\ 0.532 \\ \mathrm{Yes} \\ \mathrm{Yes} \\ \mathrm{Yes} \\ 0.045 \end{array}$	45665	matitute
<u>Z</u>	titistitute \$60 \$	nservativeness	$\begin{array}{c cccc} (4) & (5) \\ 0.036^{***} & 0.034^{**} \\ (0.011) & (0.010) \end{array}$	-0.003 (0.007)	Tavitute # ** *	0.532 0.532 Yes Yes No Yes	46282 46282	Institut
<b>%</b> .	titistitute \$6 \$	s on Degree of Co	$\begin{array}{c c} & (3) \\ (**** & 0.039*** \\ 10) & (0.010) \\ 00 & 0.018** \\ 06) & (0.008) \end{array}$	07 06) 11) 11) 12) 14 **	04) 3*** 9*** 08) 3***	08) 08) 04) 032 0.532 0 No 7es 0003	65 46282	Institut
<b>%</b> .	titistitute \$60 \$	Regression Results	$\begin{array}{c ccccc} (1) & (2) \\ (1) & (2) \\ 0.040^{***} & 0.034 \\ (0.010) & (0.01 \\ 0.017^{**} & 0.00 \\ (0.008) & (0.00 \end{array}$	-0.07 $-0.00(0.007)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.004)$ $(0.002)$	20.0- 00.0) 200.0- 00.0) 200.0- 200.0	0.065 0.055 0.065 0.055 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.05500000000	46282 456	Institut
<b>%</b> .	titistitute \$6 \$	Table 14: DID	iable: POLVIEW 	Maritule # # # #	ion Year	aible Mean	ervations &	Institut
<b>%</b> .	Institute \$6 \$	- 13 Ph	Dependent Vari After2001 * Ma Manufacture	After2001 Age Age Square	Female Highest Educat Race(Black) Bace(Othors)	Married Married Dependent Var Industry FE Year FE	Number of Obs	Institut
×.	minituite ####################################	K B B	而时间他都被送降	mutitute # # # #	39	E toutilite the the 'S PE	matinute # # B	Institute
<i>K</i>	1. We W	+ 13 M	如 旅 读 發	5. 新水水带	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	L 频频·浅外	如 频 按 塔	. ko

Institute \$ \*\*\*\*

tinstitute \$ \*\*\*\*

Institute \$ \*\* \*\*

tinstitute # \*\* \*\*

minitule # \*\*

Tastitute # \*\* \*

minitute # # '3	JOL TOT	tule 35	1. 13 %	mstitut	物於沒	PK.	stitute	N. B.	for the state	inte sta	j. 'z <sup>4</sup>	C.	加度蔬菜	PK.	stitut
mistitute # **	Living of the Pc	(0.012)	it the	0.003***	(0.001) -0.000***	0.031***	$-0.008^{***}$ (0.002)	$0.167^{***}$ (0.010)	0.000 (0.011) -0.027***	(0.006) $0.521$	Yes Yes	0.086 26873	Aute # ***	PK.	institute
mutute # # '\$	ing the Standard of (5)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.044^{***} & -0.041^{***} \\ (0.014) & (0.014) \end{array}$	0003	(0.005)	频标为	9%. 1	stitute #	N. B.	R.	0.521 2 0.521	Yes Yes No Yes	$\begin{array}{cccc} 0.017 & 0.022 \\ 26873 & 26873 \end{array}$	加化频林塔	PK.	distitute
mistime # # '3	/ernment Improvi	$\begin{array}{c} ** & -0.045 ** \\ 2) & (0.014) \end{array}$	(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)		·**	**		* ()*		0.521	$_{ m Yes}^{ m No}$	0.006 3 26873	ante sta st- 13	PK.	tstitute
而如前期代教育社会	1 Preference for Gov (1) (2)	$\begin{array}{c} -0.048^{***} & -0.039^{*} \\ (0.014) & (0.012) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$(0.005)$ $(0.003^{*:})$	(0.001	0.000	-0.007*	$0.171^{*:}$ $(0.010$ $(0.010$	0.001 (0.011 -0.025*	$\begin{array}{c} (0.006 \\ 0.521 \\ \end{array}  0.521 \end{array}$	No No No	0.000 0.075 26873 26875	tule \$15 W. B	YK.	distituti
mistitute # # '\$	egression Results or Variable: HELPP	nufacture	e e	ondenting	· 频 · 化	ondent	ucation Year	W 'S '		Varaible Mean	к- <sup>1</sup> к-	Observations	ante sta sta 'S	YK.	distitute
而就加加蘇林等	Table 15: DID Ro Dependent	After * Ma	Manufactur After2001	Age of Resp	Age Square	Sex of Resp	Highest Ed	Race(Black	Married	Dependent	Industry FI Year FE	R square Number of	ALLE WAR	9K	tstitute
Mistilute # # **	PK.	tute \$	K & W	mstitut	· 频 · 发	۶ ۴ 4	ntitute #	N. K.	&	inte sin ?	it is	E Tinist	tute # ******	9K	thittit
如 新 张 送	YR.	·····································	x 13 %		频举考	996 -	A. M	~ K *	ß	to the	× %	6	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		

Institute # \*\* \*\*

Mistille # \*\* \*\*

Mistille # # ...

Maritule # # .3

TUSTING # # ...

Maritule # # "



multitute ## # 3

TUNITUR W X 3

multint # \*\* \*

Institute # \*\* \*

Institute # \*\*\* \*

multing # \*\* \*

<b>7</b> .	mstitute	物水的	3 (%).	instit	ute Ma	**** <sup>*</sup> *	Institu	le mark	1/3 (M)	mstitut	<sup>秋</sup> 碑	1/3 (H)	mstitut	物水	13 <sup>990</sup>	fillstill	inte star ski	- Kg 840	Institut
<b>7</b> .	Institute	物水的	ial Security	(9)	-0.009 (0.012)	**** <sup>*</sup> *	0.008***	(0.001) -0.000***	(0.000) $0.057^{***}$	(0.005) -0.012***	(0.001) $0.080^{***}$	(0.006) -0.016**	(0.007) -0.011*** (0.003)	0.759 Ves	Yes Stress	37128	WE WAR	- Kg (4)-	Institute
10	Mastitute	物外的	nt Spending on Soc	$(4) \qquad (5)$	$\begin{array}{ccc} -0.015 & -0.017 \\ (0.012) & (0.012) \end{array}$	it it	$0.043^{***}$ (0.005)	IR WAR W	· 3 %	institut	N THE B	1/3 Ph	Matitute	$\begin{array}{cccc} 0.759 & 0.759 \\ \mathrm{Yes} & \mathrm{Yes} \end{array}$	No Yes 0.017 0.023	37128 37128	ule Star W	- 'B %	Institute
10	Institute	物水吃	ence for Governme	$(2) \qquad (3)$	$\begin{array}{ccc} -0.007 & -0.019 \\ (0.012) & (0.013) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{ccc} 0.012 & 0.021^* \\ (0.009) & (0.012) \end{array}$	.052*** (0.006) 008***	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.005) $(.012^{***})$	(0.001) .084***	(0.006) (0.014*	(0.007) .012*** (0.003)	0.759 0.759 No No	No Yes 0.063 0.010	37128 37128	ALL BOARD	- 13 No	Institut
<b>%</b> .	Institute	柳水坊	Results on Prefer	oc (1)	-0.017 (0.013) (	0.020 (0.012) (	$\begin{array}{c} 0.042^{***} & 0 \\ (0.005) & ( \end{array}$	。) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1	0 %		。 "你 <sup>秋</sup>	1/3 PR	tinstitut	0.759 No	No 0.004	37128	ulle Star W	*' <u>'</u> ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''	Institut
<b>%</b> 5	Mistitute	频	7: DID Regression	dent Variable: natso	* Manufacture	acture	001 Besnondent	luare *	Respondent	t Education Year	3lack)	Others)	a superior	dent Varaible Mean rv FF.		er of Observations	ille Star W	- 'E %	Institute
10	mstitute	物法的	Table 1	Depend	After *	Manuf	After20	Age Sc	Sex of	Highes	Race(F	Race((	Marrie	Depend Indust	Year F R source	onhe u	ILE Star W	_'{z} %	Institut
<b>%</b> 0	<b>Mastitute</b>	物法的	3 PR.	tusti	ute the	* <sup>*</sup> & **	matit	le way	1/3 (H)	42	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Kg K	mstitute	物法	K3 (%)	mstil	WR WR W	the offer	Institute
<b>%</b>		城水地	8		振	**** **	>	家长	1/3 Ph		、城水	* Kg (%)		城水	B Ph		w W	1/3 8/2	

Taritute # \*\* \*\*

Taritute # \*

Tastitute # # "

Taritute # \*\* \*

Taritule # # "

multine # \*



multitute ## # 3

multinte # \*\* \*

multint # \*\* \*

multinte # \*\* \*

Institute # \*\*\* \*

multing # \*\* \*